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Strategic Stability in South Asia 
June 29-July 1, 2004 
Conference Summary 
Peter R. Lavoy and Christopher Clary 
NPS Center for Contemporary Conflict 
 
 
About sixty serving and retired military officials, 
diplomats, intelligence analysts, and non-
governmental experts gathered at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California from 29 June to 2 July 2004 to 
examine ways to stabilize the military and 
nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. 
The conference was organized by the NPS 
Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). NPS 
Superintendent RDML Patrick W. Dunne 
opened the first session of the conference, and 
David Hamon of the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency provided introductory remarks 
explaining the intent of the sponsoring agency. 
CCC director Dr. Peter Lavoy introduced the 
conference’s objective: to assess the key military 
elements that affect strategic stability in a 
nuclearized South Asia. Participants from India, 
Pakistan, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom examined present and projected 
military risks, surveyed potential escalatory 
pathways, and discussed nuclear risks during 
peacetime, crisis, and war. 
 
Cold War Parallels and Contrasts 
The conference began with Dr. Patrick Morgan, 
Professor at the University of California-Irvine 
offering insightful reflections on the troubling 
Cold War experience between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Throughout the five 
decades of Cold War competition, Washington 
and Moscow struggled to attain strategic 
stability. For a deterrent to be stabilizing, it must 
be credible. In the Cold War, attaining this 
credibility—necessary for attaining long-term 
stability—often generated short- and medium-
term instabilities. Both parties performed 
elaborate rituals (nuclear testing, missile flight 
tests, command post exercises) to demonstrate 
the credibility of their nuclear threats. Concerns 
over the delicacy of deterrence meant that 
technological evolutions (ballistic missiles, 
MIRVing, improved accuracy, and missile 
defenses) could trigger destabilizing iterations of 
reactions and counterreactions. 
 
 
Conference participants (from left to right), former Indian 
army chief V.P. Malik, Group Captain Khawar Hussain of 
the Pakistani Air Force, and U.S. scholar Stephen Cohen. 
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Attempting to ascertain the source of each 
superpower’s nuclear policy was difficult, 
complicating the analysis of the choices the 
adversary would make. Nuclear policy, doctrine, 
and operations during the Cold War were the 
product of a lively and convoluted process 
involving thousands of players over the fifty 
year of conflict, many of which held quite 
different views on what stability meant. 
 
 
State Department official Robert Gromoll, Indian scholar 
Rajesh Basrur, Pakistani scholar Rifaat Hussain, CCC 
fellow Brig. (ret.) Feroz Hassan Khan, Indian retired 
Admiral Raja Menon, and U.S. scholar Michael Krepon. 
 
As former U.S. government official Michael 
Wheeler observed, even the last decade of the 
Cold War produced grave concerns on both 
sides about the adversary attempting some sort 
of nuclear first use. Arms control restrained 
arms races, but strategic planners still sought 
qualitative and quantitative improvements that 
might allow them to “escape” from deterrence. 
In the end, the superpowers avoided conflict, but 
they never quite achieved a condition of static 
stability. Moscow could only keep pace by 
expending massive resources—an effort that 
would bankrupt its economy and ultimately 
cause its collapse. Wheeler stressed that the 
principal lesson of the Cold War was the 
necessity of a two-track stability process. One 
track involved the patient pursuit of the 
settlement of fundamental political differences. 
Simultaneously, negotiations were held to 
stabilize nuclear arms races and lower the risk of 
inadvertent or accidental triggers to nuclear war. 
 
Perhaps luckily, South Asian policymakers have 
had a much more relaxed view toward nuclear 
deterrence. India conducted its first nuclear test 
in 1974—but the weapon was too large to be 
delivered by any aircraft in India’s arsenal. 
Pakistan matched India’s nuclear test with a not-
so-hidden weapons program of its own. 
However, neither side felt compelled to test a 
nuclear explosive device until May 1998. A 
credible deterrent, at least initially, did not need 
to be visible. A bomb in the basement would do. 
Even after the 1998 nuclear tests, nuclear 
weapons have had a surprisingly low salience in 
regional crises and competitions. As Dr. Rajesh 
Basrur of the Centre for Global Studies in 
Mumbai, India, argued, “In contrast with the 
Cold War, there has been no direct nuclear 
component in the confrontations between India 
and Pakistan. Though there is much talk of an 
arms race, there is no evidence of haste in the 




NPS student from Pakistan and the United States. 
 
 
U.S. Department of Energy official Scott Davis and Gen. 
(ret.) V.P. Malik. 
 
 
Nuclear Deterrence, Doctrine & Force Posture 
The untested nuclear weapons in the Indian and 
Pakistani arsenals were low-maintenance 
devices. Force postures, doctrines, delivery 
systems, and command and control practices 
developed slowly, outside of the public glare, 
because there was no strategic urgency to do 
otherwise. While both India and Pakistan had 
dueling missile tests in the mid-1990s, their pace 
was more indicative of a research and 
development effort than a crash program to 
achieve nuclear deterrence. 
After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, U.S. 
interlocutors, and nascent non-governmental 
strategic communities in Islamabad and Delhi, 
began to prod their governments to add flesh to 
the nuclear skeleton. India issued a draft 
doctrine—articulating a strategy of massive 
retaliation after the absorption of a nuclear first 
strike. One aspect of this policy—that India 
would not be the first to use weapons of mass 
destruction—comforted U.S. policymakers, 
although it failed to adequately reassure strategic 
planners in Islamabad. As Air Commodore 
Khalid Banuri of the Pakistan Strategic Plans 
Division stated, “Considering ‘No First Use’ 
(NFU) as a flawed argument, the possibility of 
an Indian pre-emptive strike cannot be ruled out. 
To cater for such [an] eventuality, Pakistan has 
to factor in all options to ensure that its response 
remains viable. Thus the rising conventional 
imbalance and the lack of confidence in NFU 




Air Commodore Khalid Banuri of the Pakistan Strategic 
Plans Division and Dr. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie 
Endowment of International Peace. 
 
 4
Pakistan had struggled since its independence in 
1947 to confront an India that was larger and 
militarily stronger. Dr. Rifaat Hussain, of the 
Pakistan National Defence College, noted that 
Pakistan’s initial attempts to externally balance 
against India (through alliances) failed. During 
the 1965 war, the United States cut off military 
supplies to both countries, despite Pakistan’s 
membership in the SEATO and CENTO 
alliances. In 1971, as Pakistan lost its eastern 
wing to an Indian-supported Bangladeshi 
insurgency, the United States stood by. As a 
result, Pakistan launched its own nuclear 




Dr. Rifaat Hussain and University of Bradford scholar 
Maria Sultan. 
 
By 1985, Pakistan had developed a recessed 
nuclear weapons capability. Pakistani officials 
felt that their displays of military readiness (and 
their undeployed nuclear deterrent) had 
prevented war during the 1987 Brasstacks Crisis 
and 1990 Zarb-e-Momin exercises and during 
several other crises over the past two decades. 
Their decision to go ahead with a nuclear 
capability allowed them to quickly respond in 
1998 when India tested. They believe that 
nuclear weapons and conventional forces were 
crucial in deterring India from prosecuting a 
“limited war,” as a response to either the 1999 
Kargil operation or the 2001 terrorist attack on 
the Indian parliament in New Delhi. 
Today, nuclear weapons are central to Pakistani 
strategic thought, especially with regard to 
deterring India from initiating large-scale 
military operations against Pakistan. As Rifaat 
Hussain argued, “In the absence of both an 
offensive conventional capability, which will 
allow it to disrupt an Indian offensive 
preemptively, and the geostrategic space in 
which to maneuver and fight in a defense-in-
depth strategy, Pakistan’s physical protection 
can only be assured by nuclear weapons. 
Islamabad expects that in the event of an Indian 
attack, its offensive would be met in the first 
instance by a non-nuclear defense of the forward 
areas close to the border. Should Islamabad fail 
to hold the front by non-nuclear combat, it 
would warn New Delhi that small-yield nuclear 
weapons would be used to strike at the invading 
Indian forces. And then, as a last resort, it would 
strike with such weapons if the warning went 
unheeded.” The question of how Pakistan would 
employ nuclear weapons, if it ever did do so, 




Dr. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. 
 
Feroz Hassan Khan and Shankar Bajpai, former Indian 
ambassador to the United States, Pakistan, and China. 
 
Pakistani officials believed it was necessary to 
demonstrate their willingness and capability to 
use nuclear forces in extremis. They publicly 
talked about how strategic forces would be 
managed and how command and control would 
operate at the macro-level. As Brigadier (ret.) 
Feroz Hassan Khan, a visiting professor at NPS, 
noted, the Pakistan government intentionally has 
not elaborated on its nuclear use doctrine. 
Islamabad officials have avoided any formal 
discussion of nuclear thresholds or weapons 
employment concepts so as to complicate any 
Indian decision to use force. 
 
Indian planners have viewed the situation quite 
differently. As Dr. Rajesh Basrur, director of the 
Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India, 
observed, Indian planners do not believe that 
nuclear weapons are central to Indian security. 
Nuclear weapons, for India, are political, rather 
than operational, instruments. The fact that both 
parties had fought a limited war over the Kargil 
heights in 1999 upset, but did not fundamentally 
alter, these Indian beliefs. In fact, Indian 
frustration over Pakistan’s continued support of 
Kashmiri separatists combined with anger at 
Pakistan’s Kargil escapade led it to consider 
limited war options. Indian planners apparently 
concluded: if one side can hide behind nuclear 
weapons in order to foment violence, we can 
respond in a limited fashion. 
 
 
CCC research professor Lt. Col. (ret.) Surinder Rana and 
Dr. Wyn Bowen of King’s College London. 
 
Comfort and Dilemmas 
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Despite approaching nuclear necessity from very 
different perspectives, both sides appear to be 
comfortable with their present nuclear status. 
India feels that its large geographic size and 
abundant natural boundaries make its nuclear 
force relatively invulnerable. Moreover, its more 
relaxed retaliation-only strategy affords it time 
to react to any irrational nuclear attack. Indian 
planners are at least publicly adamant that any 
Indian response to nuclear use would be certain 
and massive. Pakistan feels that a mobile and 
dispersed nuclear arsenal is nearly invulnerable, 
even from increasingly advanced Indian 
conventional capabilities.  
 
 
Maria Sultan, with CCC research associate Christopher 
Clary in the background. 
 
Despite this relative comfort with the status quo, 
both countries face considerable strategic 
dilemmas. India hopes to conventionally 
threaten Pakistan in order to alter Pakistani 
political and military behavior. As General (ret.) 
V. P. Malik, former Indian chief of army staff, 
noted, when a nation is targeted by what it 
perceives to be state-sponsored proxy war, 
“when pushed to the wall, [it] is tempted to use 
its conventional forces to bring the proxy war 
into the open, rather than fight with all the 
limitations of a ‘no war no peace situation.’” It 
can fight in the open—initiate conventional 
hostilities—because, as General Malik argues, 
“space exists between proxy war/low-intensity 
conflict and a nuclear umbrella wherein a 
limited conventional war is a distinct 
possibility.” 
In order to initiate hostilities against Pakistani 
targets, however, New Delhi must find ways to 
prevent an escalatory military spiral. It probably 
would do so by initiating attacks that are limited 
in time but spread out over space, or limited in 
space but spread out over time. However, it was 
observed that escalation is always the option of 
the opponent. Would an Indian attack lead to an 
unexpected and escalatory Pakistani counter-




CCC director Peter Lavoy. 
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While Pakistan can escalate, is that a rational 
decision for Pakistan? Widening a conventional 
conflict could prove devastating to Pakistan 
given India’s growing conventional force 
imbalance. As Pakistani Air Commodore Tariq 
Ashraf argued, “The increasing conventional 
gap is bound to result in a lowering of Pakistan’s 
nuclear threshold and making it more prone to 
resorting to the nuclear option in any future 
military conflict between the two countries.”  
 
 
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Asad Durrani, fmr. head of Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence and fmr. ambassador to Saudi Arabia. 
 
However, this is a challenging threat to make 
credibly. If Pakistan aims to raise the nuclear 
bogey, it must be willing to “go nuclear” in 
response to an Indian conventional attack. It 
must initiate this nuclear attack knowing that it 
will lead to national suicide—Pakistan will 
cease to exist as a viable state if India responds 
massively. India, on the other hand, must 
threaten to massively retaliate against Pakistani 
cities, even if Pakistan only uses a single nuclear 
weapon against Indian military forces operating 
in Pakistani territory. Such an attack would be 
disproportionate and unjust—but moving toward 
flexible response could require a massive 
expansion of Indian nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems, and a radical revision of 
India’s existing civil-military relationships and 
command and control arrangements. 
 
Command and Control Dilemmas 
Controlling nuclear weapons presents its own set 
of dilemmas. Strategic planners hope, as Duke 
professor Peter Feaver noted almost a decade 
ago, that nuclear weapons would always be used 
when ordered but never used when not. To 
oversimplify the conference deliberations, for 
Pakistan the overwhelming concern over the 
“never” problem has pushed it toward a posture 
of “always;” while for India the overarching 
worry about “always” has produced a command 




U.S. State Department official John Schlosser, David 
Hamon of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Dr. 
Glen Segell of the UK Institute of Security Policy. 
 
Air Commodore Banuri discussed Pakistan’s 
unique challenges, as it faces down a very large-
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scale Indian conventional threat. Islamabad is 
not comforted by India’s nuclear “no-first-use” 
declaration. “Pakistan has created an elaborate 
infrastructure to improve technical and physical 
security of its nuclear assets and facilities during 
peace and war,” Banuri said. He continued, 
“Pakistan has created [a] fairly good [command 
and control system] as an interim measure to 
exercise effective command over its nuclear 
forces that will not fail during crisis/war.” While 
the Pakistani “mid-term quest for a robust, all 
encompassing and technological viable C4I2 SR 
system is moving at a satisfactory pace,” Banuri 
noted the importance of human reliability. 
“Technical solutions are no substitute for and do 
not guarantee good judgment, clear analysis, or 
self-discipline under stress,” he asserted. 
 
 
American scholar Rodney Jones, NPS Professor Anshu 
Chatterjee, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency official 
Jeffrey Milstein. 
 
Pakistan had recently augmented its safety and 
security structure for its nuclear arsenal, Banuri 
announced. The Pakistan armed forces created a 
security unit within the Strategic Plans Division, 
headed by a two-star general, to continuously 
monitor and defend against both insider and 
outsider threats. While Pakistan feels confident 
in the physical security around its nuclear sites, 
it still remains open to outside assistance, so 
long as the principle of non-intrusiveness is 
maintained. 
 
Indian command and control challenges center 
around efforts to ensure that a residual nuclear 
capability will still be usable after absorbing an 
adversary’s first strike. As Brigadier (ret.) 
Gurmeet Kanwal of the Observers Research 
Foundation in Delhi argued, “The credibility of 
a nuclear deterrent that is limited to retaliatory 
strikes only hinges around the ability of the 
nuclear force to survive a first strike in sufficient 
numbers to inflict unacceptable punishment in 
retaliation.” By not pursuing “first use” nuclear 
strategies, India dramatically simplified its 
command and control requirements. By settling 
on a “ride-out-and-retaliate” posture, India will 
have to develop detailed plans for the succession 
of national command authority and steps to 
ensure that surviving nuclear warheads can be 
mated and launched even after a nuclear attack 
has severely disrupted the national command 
and control system. The conference participants 
noted that these imperatives were not given 
much consideration when the Indian government 
decided to become an overt nuclear-weapon 




Brigadier (ret.) Gurmeet Kanwal, of the Institute of 




Dr. Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Security Studies and U.S. Department 
of Energy official Steve Aoki. 
 
Next Steps 
The conference concluded with a discussion on 
the potential for confidence building, arms 
control, and nuclear risk reduction measures in 
South Asia. A panel chaired by Dr. Rose 
Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace considered the next steps 
that concerned governments should take to 
improve stability on the subcontinent. Brig. 
Naeem Salik of the Pakistani Strategic Plans 
Division initiated the discussion. He argued that 
it was necessary to create an insulated and 
sustainable process of dialogue. While Salik was 
predisposed favorably towards mutual and 
balanced force reductions, he realized that 
India’s broader concerns (read “China”) made 
such negotiations quite difficult. Salik proposed 
moving ahead with the upgradation of the 
DGMO hotline and the establishment of a 
review and oversight commission to ensure that 
existing confidence-building measures are being 
implemented properly. 
 
C. Raja Mohan, Jawaharlal Nehru University 
professor and respected journalist in Delhi, 
presented an Indian perspective. Mohan was 
hopeful, arguing, “It is reasonable to expect 
modest but steady progress in nuclear 
confidence-building in the coming period.” He 
summarized Indian thought on the issue: “India 
is aware that it is at the very beginning of a 
process of constructing nuclear and conventional 
military stability with Pakistan. It is prepared to 
consider and implement a range of CBMs on the 
nuclear front that is focused on exchange of 
information, communication, and interaction. 
Such measures, India hopes, will enhance the 
security of both sides. India, however, is 
unlikely to accept at this stage any proposals that 
aim to constrain its nuclear force structure and 
their deployment as some of Pakistan’s 





Peter Lavoy with CCC research assistants Izumi 
Wakugawa, Lashley Pulsipher, and Elizabeth Stone 
 
 
Future Work on Stability in South Asia 
The Center for Contemporary Conflict was left 
with much work to do after the conference 
successfully concluded. Professor Lavoy plans 
on taking the show on the road—holding 
workshops in New Delhi and Islamabad, and 
perhaps other venues in India and Pakistan, to 
gauge regional reaction and thought on how best 
to understand security dynamics on the 
subcontinent. Additional work is beginning on 
gaining deeper understanding into command and 
control in emerging nuclear states and of paths 
that can be pursued for bringing India, Pakistan, 
and Israel into the international non-proliferation 
regime. For now, the CCC staff will be busy 
editing the excellent essays from the conference 
into a book, which should be published late in 
2005.
Monterey Conference Participants 
